Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers
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Publication:6088783
DOI10.3982/QE1781OpenAlexW4285286536MaRDI QIDQ6088783
Pasha Andreyanov, Unnamed Author
Publication date: 16 November 2023
Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/qe1781
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Cites Work
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