Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
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Publication:2000832
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Cites work
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- Competitive bidding with entry costs
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- Identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity
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- Identification of mixture models using support variations
- Identification of paired nonseparable measurement error models
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- Instrumental Variable Treatment of Nonclassical Measurement Error Models
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- Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions
- Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
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- Nonparametric estimation of utility function in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- On characterizing the gamma and the normal distribution
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- Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
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- Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
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Cited in
(20)- Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
- Numerical computation of equilibrium bid functions in a first-price auction with heterogeneous risk attitudes
- Identification and estimation of auction model with two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity
- Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
- Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty
- Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers
- Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- A new approach to identifying generalized competing risks models with application to second-price auctions
- Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach
- Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
- Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction
- First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk
- Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements
- Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
- Deconvolution from two order statistics
- Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions
- Two results on auctions with endogenous entry
- Scaling auctions as insurance: a case study in infrastructure procurement
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