First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.06.008zbMATH1239.91069OpenAlexW2093289339MaRDI QIDQ425709FDOQ425709

Authors François Maréchal, Pierre-Henri Morand

Publication date 8 June 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetryrisk aversionauctionexpected revenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Separating probability weighting and risk aversion in first-price auctions
• Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values
• Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
• The role of varying risk attitudes in an auction with a buyout option
• Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
• Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
• Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asset Prices and Trading Volume in a Beauty Contest
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes

Cited in

(15)

• Separating probability weighting and risk aversion in first-price auctions
• How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
• First Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Bidders’ Heterogeneous Risk Behavior: An Adversarial Risk Analysis Approach
• Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values
• A first-price sealed-bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective CRRA and general utility functions
• Procurement bidding in first-price and second-price, sealed-bid auctions within the common-value paradigm
• Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth
• Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
• Numerical computation of equilibrium bid functions in a first-price auction with heterogeneous risk attitudes
• Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
• Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Selling to the highest valuation bidder under risk aversion and asymmetry
• Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions

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