First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk
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Publication:425709
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.06.008zbMATH Open1239.91069OpenAlexW2093289339MaRDI QIDQ425709FDOQ425709
Authors: François Maréchal, Pierre-Henri Morand 
Publication date: 8 June 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.008
Recommendations
- Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Separating probability weighting and risk aversion in first-price auctions
- Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values
- Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
- Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
- The role of varying risk attitudes in an auction with a buyout option
- Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
- Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
Cites Work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements
- Asset Prices and Trading Volume in a Beauty Contest
Cited In (13)
- Numerical computation of equilibrium bid functions in a first-price auction with heterogeneous risk attitudes
- How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
- Procurement bidding in first-price and second-price, sealed-bid auctions within the common-value paradigm
- Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- A first-price sealed-bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective CRRA and general utility functions
- Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
- Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
- Selling to the highest valuation bidder under risk aversion and asymmetry
- Separating probability weighting and risk aversion in first-price auctions
- Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values
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