Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements
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Publication:527918
DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.09.011zbMath1443.62434MaRDI QIDQ527918
Publication date: 12 May 2017
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304407611001746
estimation; first-price auctions; independent private values; semiparametric identification; asymmetric risk aversion
62P20: Applications of statistics to economics
62G05: Nonparametric estimation
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Multiattribute Procurement Auctions: Efficiency and Social Welfare in Theory and Practice, Nonparametric Estimation of Large Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders, Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction, A functional estimation approach to the first-price auction models, Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion, Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective, First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk, Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth, Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers, Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity, How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?
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