Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements

DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.09.011zbMath1443.62434OpenAlexW2084914458MaRDI QIDQ527918

Sandra Campo

Publication date: 12 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304407611001746

zbMATH Keywords

estimationfirst-price auctionsindependent private valuessemiparametric identificationasymmetric risk aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Nonparametric estimation (62G05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers ⋮ How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations? ⋮ Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth ⋮ Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction ⋮ A functional estimation approach to the first-price auction models ⋮ Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion ⋮ First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk ⋮ Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity ⋮ Multiattribute Procurement Auctions: Efficiency and Social Welfare in Theory and Practice ⋮ Nonparametric Estimation of Large Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders

Cites Work

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• Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
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• Identification of Standard Auction Models
• High bids and broke winners

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