How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?
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Publication:2181485
DOI10.1515/jem-2017-0001zbMath1440.62381OpenAlexW3124106548MaRDI QIDQ2181485
Hisayuki Yoshimoto, Kirill Chernomaz
Publication date: 19 May 2020
Published in: Journal of Econometric Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/197812/8/197812.pdf
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Density estimation (62G07) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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