Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00239zbMath1064.91509OpenAlexW3125999389MaRDI QIDQ4446339

Kenneth Hendricks, Robert H. Porter, Joris Pinkse

Publication date: 22 March 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00239

zbMATH Keywords

testsstatic prediction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (27)

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