Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
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Publication:4446339
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- How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?
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- Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
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- Structural econometric methods in auctions: a guide to the literature
- Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
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- The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction
- Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable
- Randomization tests of copula symmetry
- Monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first-price auctions
- Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
- Participation constraints in first-price auctions
- Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auction Models
- Identification and inference in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry
- Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
- A consistent nonparametric test of affiliation in auction models
- Effects of competition in first-price auctions
- Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- Compensating for the winner's curse: Experimental evidence
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