Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
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Publication:2472438
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0223-xzbMath1134.91020OpenAlexW2146446356MaRDI QIDQ2472438
Publication date: 22 February 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0223-x
Related Items (6)
Effects of competition in first-price auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Information concentration in common value environments ⋮ Information revelation in competitive markets ⋮ Premium auctions in the field ⋮ Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
Cites Work
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- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Uniform conditional variability ordering of probability distributions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
- Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
- The Affiliation Effect in First-Price Auctions
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