Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
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Publication:660109
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.006zbMath1231.91115OpenAlexW2139529488MaRDI QIDQ660109
Publication date: 25 January 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96668/files/NDL2010-119.pdf
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items
Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
Cites Work
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