Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.10.006MaRDI QIDQ660109zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Françoise Forges, Ram Orzach

Publication date 25 January 2012

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96668/files/NDL2010-119.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

characteristic functioncoreBayesian gamecollusionauctionspartition form game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
• Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
• Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
• Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price
• Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
• On ring formation in auctions
• Rings in auctions. An experimental approach
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
• A note on the incentive compatible core
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
• Bidder collusion
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
• Cores of convex games
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Incentives in Teams
• Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• N‐person games in partition function form
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Stable Cartels
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects

Cited in

(4)

• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
• Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information

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