Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2442819
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.003zbMath1290.91069OpenAlexW3124756438MaRDI QIDQ2442819
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.003
Related Items (3)
Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games ⋮ Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
Cites Work
- Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
- Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
- A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
This page was built for publication: Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
