Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.12.003MaRDI QIDQ2442819zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Heng Liu

Publication date 1 April 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscommon valueequilibrium selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
• Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty

Cites work

• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
• Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
• Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

Cited in

(13)

• On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
• Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
• Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
• Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria
• Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection
• Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games
• Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
• Asymmetric auctions: perturbations, \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium, and equilibrium
• Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions

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