Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.07.010MaRDI QIDQ1007771zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nathan C. Larson

Publication date 24 March 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.010

zbMATH Keywords

differential informationcommon value auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Successful uninformed bidding

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information
• Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
• Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
• Communications to the editor: Competitive bidding with disparate information
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Successful uninformed bidding
• The convolution inequality for entropy powers
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction

Cited in

(17)

• Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
• Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions
• Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
• Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
• Valuing dealers' informational advantage: a study of Canadian Treasury auctions
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
• Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
• Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
• Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
• Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6314686 (Why is no real title available?)
• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
• Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
• The insider's curse

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