Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1007771
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.07.010zbMATH Open1158.91364OpenAlexW3121931913MaRDI QIDQ1007771FDOQ1007771
Authors: Nathan C. Larson
Publication date: 24 March 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.010
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
- The convolution inequality for entropy powers
- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Communications to the editor: Competitive bidding with disparate information
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information
- An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information
- Successful uninformed bidding
- Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
Cited In (16)
- Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
- Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
- Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
- Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
- Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
- An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
- Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
- Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
- Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals
- The insider's curse
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
- Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
- Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
- The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
This page was built for publication: Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1007771)