Competitive bidding and proprietary information
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Publication:1839184
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(83)90034-4zbMath0511.90021WikidataQ56481605 ScholiaQ56481605MaRDI QIDQ1839184
Robert J. Weber, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Paul R. Milgrom
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d05/d0531.pdf
asymmetric information; private information; sealed-bid auction; equilibria of the bidding game are determined; equilibrium bid distributions; sale of an object
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Cites Work
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
- Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
