Competitive bidding and proprietary information

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(83)90034-4zbMath0511.90021OpenAlexW2004539030WikidataQ56481605 ScholiaQ56481605MaRDI QIDQ1839184

Robert J. Weber, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Paul R. Milgrom

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d05/d0531.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationprivate informationsealed-bid auctionequilibria of the bidding game are determinedequilibrium bid distributionssale of an object

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (36)

Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit ⋮ Sequential bargaining with common values ⋮ Information revelation in auctions ⋮ Information acquisition in conflicts ⋮ A correction to uniqueness in ``Competitive bidding and proprietary information ⋮ Bidding between incumbent and entrant ⋮ Information revelation and efficiency in auctions ⋮ Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information ⋮ Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design ⋮ Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information ⋮ Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction ⋮ The value of information in a sealed-bid auction ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Common-value contests with asymmetric information ⋮ Partnership dissolution and proprietary information ⋮ Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders ⋮ An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner ⋮ The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions ⋮ Successful uninformed bidding ⋮ Auctions with an inexpert bidder ⋮ Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions ⋮ On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions ⋮ Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale ⋮ The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle ⋮ The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids ⋮ Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions ⋮ Private information revelation in common-value auctions ⋮ Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? ⋮ Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples ⋮ A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders ⋮ An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information ⋮ Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions

Cites Work

• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
• Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs

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