Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.03.008MaRDI QIDQ6102575zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrew McClellan

Publication date 23 June 2023

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetryauctionscommon-valueinformation disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Information revelation in auctions
• Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
• Optimal auctions and information disclosure
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition
• Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
• Information design in optimal auctions
• Private versus complete information in auctions

Cites work

• A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal information exchange in contests
• Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction

Cited in

(4)

• Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition
• Who else is bidding? The Pareto optimality of disclosing bidder identities.
• Encouraging information sharing to boost the name-your-own-price auction
• On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions

This page was built for publication: Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6102575)