Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.03.008zbMATH Open1519.91131OpenAlexW4360841431MaRDI QIDQ6102575FDOQ6102575

Authors: Andrew McClellan 

Publication date: 23 June 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.008

Recommendations

• Information revelation in auctions
• Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
• Optimal auctions and information disclosure
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition
• Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
• Information design in optimal auctions
• Private versus complete information in auctions

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetryauctionsinformation disclosurecommon-value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
• Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Optimal information exchange in contests
• A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions

Cited In (4)

• Encouraging information sharing to boost the name-your-own-price auction
• Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition
• Who else is bidding? The Pareto optimality of disclosing bidder identities.
• On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions

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