Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
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Recommendations
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
- Information revelation in auctions
- Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
- The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
- Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Mid-auction information acquisition
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
Cited in
(26)- Mid-auction information acquisition
- Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
- An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions
- Information disclosure and pricing policies for sales of network goods
- Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
- Information revelation in auctions
- Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
- Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
- Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty
- Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
- Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects
- Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets
- Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition
- Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design
- Who else is bidding? The Pareto optimality of disclosing bidder identities.
- Efficient dark markets
- Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation
- Information and coordination frictions in experimental posted offer markets
- Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
- Information revelation in competitive markets
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
- Introduction to the symposium
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