The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions

DOI10.1007/S10058-012-0115-9MaRDI QIDQ1929136zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre-Henri Morand, François Maréchal

Publication date 7 January 2013

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0115-9

zbMATH Keywords

informationauctionsrisk-aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Information revelation in auctions
• Unraveling in first-price auction.
• Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asset Prices and Trading Volume in a Beauty Contest
• Manipulative auction design

Cited in

(16)

• Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
• Unraveling in first-price auction.
• I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions
• Reputational bidding
• Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
• Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
• Incomplete Information, High-Low Bidding and Public Information in First Price Auctions
• He who must not be named
• Ex Post Information in Auctions
• Price reveal auctions
• Information revelation in auctions
• Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
• Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders

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