Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions

DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1039-yzbMath1402.91180OpenAlexW2594869677MaRDI QIDQ1640592

Cristián Troncoso-Valverde

Publication date: 14 June 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1039-y

zbMATH Keywords

second-price auctionsinformation structurescompeting auctionsprivate provision of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (4)

Effects of competition in first-price auctions ⋮ Two-stage contests with preferences over style ⋮ Competing auctions with non-identical objects ⋮ Prices versus auctions in large markets

Cites Work

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• Optimal auctions and information disclosure
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Logconcavity versus logconvexity: A complete characterization
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
• Mean, median, mode II
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• A First Course in Order Statistics
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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