Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
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Recommendations
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
Cites work
- A First Course in Order Statistics
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3265169 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Logconcavity versus logconvexity: A complete characterization
- Mean, median, mode II
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
Cited in
(7)- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
- The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Prices versus auctions in large markets
- Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
- Two-stage contests with preferences over style
- Competing auctions with non-identical objects
- Effects of competition in first-price auctions
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