Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
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Publication:4286285
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- Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse
- Competition in online markets with auctions and posted prices
- Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.
- Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result
- On second-price auctions and imperfect competition.
- A model of merchants
- Price competition for an informed buyer
- Sequential contracting with multiple principals
- Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
- Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
- Directed search and optimal production
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
- Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions
- Dynamic Auctions
- Internet auctions with many traders
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
- Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
- Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller
- Large strategic dynamic interactions
- Introduction to search theory and applications
- Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand
- Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
- Directed search with endogenous capacity
- A model of competing selling mechanisms
- A learning approach to auctions
- Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
- Reciprocal contracting
- Bidding for incentive contracts
- Surplus extraction and competition
- Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies.
- Competing first-price and second-price auctions
- Sequential selling mechanisms
- Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
- A theory of production, matching, and distribution
- On the competitive resolution of trading uncertainty
- On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
- Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
- Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
- Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers
- Markets versus negotiations: an experimental investigation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 853111 (Why is no real title available?)
- Limits of efficiency in sequential auctions
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals
- High profit equilibria in directed search models
- Dynamic directed random matching
- Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
- Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
- Indeterminacy and directed search.
- Auction timing and market thickness
- Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions
- Competition among auctioneers in large markets
- The value of temptation
- Private communication in competing mechanism games
- MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
- Simultaneous bidding in competing auctions
- Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection
- Efficient club formation in a frictional environment
- Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
- Competing auctions with non-identical objects
- Equivalence of canonical matching models
- How to sell in a sequential auction market
- Who wants to be an auctioneer?
- Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection
- Parallel innovation contests
- Prices versus auctions in large markets
- Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers
- Posted price selling and online auctions
- Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
- Mechanism design with aftermarkets: cutoff mechanisms
- Competitive search with ex-post opportunism
- General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
- Imperfect competition in online auctions
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