Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
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Publication:4286285
DOI10.2307/2951643zbMATH Open0791.90018OpenAlexW2157518489MaRDI QIDQ4286285FDOQ4286285
Authors: R. Preston McAfee 
Publication date: 27 March 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951643
Recommendations
competitive equilibriumasymmetric informationmechanism designauctionsprice formationmany buyersmany sellers
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic growth models (91B62)
Cited In (80)
- Competitive search with ex-post opportunism
- Private communication in competing mechanism games
- MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
- Efficient club formation in a frictional environment
- Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection
- Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers
- How to sell in a sequential auction market
- Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
- Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
- Parallel Innovation Contests
- Competing auctions with non-identical objects
- Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection
- Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions
- Prices versus auctions in large markets
- Who wants to be an auctioneer?
- Posted price selling and online auctions
- Simultaneous bidding in competing auctions
- General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
- Imperfect competition in online auctions
- A learning approach to auctions
- Equivalence of canonical matching models
- Bidding for incentive contracts
- Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Dynamic Auctions
- Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions
- Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
- Introduction to search theory and applications
- Large strategic dynamic interactions
- On the competitive resolution of trading uncertainty
- Directed search and optimal production
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
- Competing first-price and second-price auctions
- On second-price auctions and imperfect competition.
- Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result
- Price competition for an informed buyer
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Sequential contracting with multiple principals
- Indeterminacy and directed search.
- A model of merchants
- On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
- Competition among auctioneers in large markets
- The value of temptation
- Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
- Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
- Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
- Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
- Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
- Competition in online markets with auctions and posted prices
- A model of competing selling mechanisms
- Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
- Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals
- High profit equilibria in directed search models
- Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment
- Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies.
- Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
- A theory of production, matching, and distribution
- Sequential selling mechanisms
- Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers
- Sequentially optimal auctions
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Internet auctions with many traders
- Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Dynamic directed random matching
- Reciprocal contracting
- Directed Search with Endogenous Capacity
- Limits of efficiency in sequential auctions
- Markets versus negotiations: an experimental investigation
- Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
- Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller
- Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice
- Surplus extraction and competition
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