A learning approach to auctions
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Publication:1270753
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2419zbMath0910.90119OpenAlexW2004521211MaRDI QIDQ1270753
Aner Sela, Shlomit Hon-Snir, Dov Monderer
Publication date: 19 April 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2900/1/dp97_11.pdf
Related Items
Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions, Evolutionary stability in first price auctions, Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information, Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms, On the convergence of genetic learning in a double auction market, Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching, Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited, Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions, Brown's original fictitious play
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