Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions

DOI10.1007/S10479-012-1148-8zbMATH Open1259.91051OpenAlexW2153122315MaRDI QIDQ1761811FDOQ1761811

Shie Mannor, Amir Danak

Publication date: 15 November 2012

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-012-1148-8

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryrepeated gamesapproximation methodsmathematical optimizationauctionsBayesian equilibriumdecision-making problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
• Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
• Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
• Rationality and bounded rationality
• A learning approach to auctions
• How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
• Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales

Cited In (1)

• A ``fractal solution to the chopstick auction

Uses Software

• FEAPpv

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