Revenue-Maximizing Auctions: A Bidder’s Standpoint
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Publication:5058041
DOI10.1287/opre.2022.2316OpenAlexW4287378016MaRDI QIDQ5058041
Vianney Perchet, Noureddine El Karoui, Clément Calauzènes, Thomas Nedelec
Publication date: 1 December 2022
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2316
Cites Work
- Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity
- Revenue maximization with a single sample
- Optimal Auction Design
- Making the Most of Your Samples
- On asymmetric reserve prices
- Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions
- Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions
- The sample complexity of revenue maximization
- The sample complexity of auctions with side information
- Introduction to nonparametric estimation
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