Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity

DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3zbMath1271.91061MaRDI QIDQ361816

Christian Ewerhart

Publication date: 19 August 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3

zbMATH Keywords

regularity; generalized concavity; mechanism design; Prékopa-Borell theorem; virtual valuation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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