Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity
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Publication:361816
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3zbMath1271.91061OpenAlexW1983737479MaRDI QIDQ361816
Publication date: 19 August 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3
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Standard risk aversion and efficient risk sharing ⋮ Revenue-Maximizing Auctions: A Bidder’s Standpoint ⋮ Pricing with Samples ⋮ The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments ⋮ On the curvature of homogeneous functions ⋮ Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition ⋮ Advertising a second-price auction ⋮ Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines ⋮ Quantile analysis of ``hazard-rate game models ⋮ Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints ⋮ Cournot games with biconcave demand ⋮ Nonparametric tests for strictly increasing virtual valuations ⋮ A closer look at two conjectures about irregular marginal revenue
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