Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity
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Publication:361816
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3zbMath1271.91061MaRDI QIDQ361816
Publication date: 19 August 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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