Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
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Publication:899681
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.10.007zbMATH Open1369.91071OpenAlexW2181125495MaRDI QIDQ899681FDOQ899681
Authors: Konrad Mierendorff 
Publication date: 30 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1507758/
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
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Cited In (19)
- Auction timing and market thickness
- Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
- Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels
- Online incentive-compatible mechanisms for traffic intersection auctions
- Quantity premiums and discounts in dynamic pricing
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Asymmetric reduced form auctions
- Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search
- Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
- Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment
- Calendar mechanisms
- Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
- Dynamic mechanism design on social networks
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
- Optimal reform postponement
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