Ironing in Dynamic Revenue Management: Posted Prices & Biased Auctions

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973105.45MaRDI QIDQ5741753zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai

Publication date 15 May 2019

Published in Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973105.45

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(8)

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