Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained
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Publication:709082
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.024zbMATH Open1196.91032OpenAlexW2065241295MaRDI QIDQ709082FDOQ709082
Publication date: 15 October 2010
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.024
Cites Work
Cited In (8)
- Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- Dynamic lot-sizing in sequential online auction systems with reserve price
- Reserve prices in repeated auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Ironing in Dynamic Revenue Management: Posted Prices & Biased Auctions
- Threshold mechanisms for dynamic procurement with abandonment
- Dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and a strategic buyer
- Properties of bid and ask reservation prices in the rank-dependent expected utility model
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