Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps

DOI10.3982/TE2939MaRDI QIDQ3299502zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Brian Baisa, Justin Burkett

Publication date 23 July 2020

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2939

zbMATH Keywords

multi-unit auctionsresalequantity caps

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(3)

• Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained
• The expected stop-out price in a discriminating auction
• Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions

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