Robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities
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Publication:5028526
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDY041OpenAlexW3125128899WikidataQ129481698 ScholiaQ129481698MaRDI QIDQ5028526FDOQ5028526
Authors: Gabriel Carroll, I. R. Segal' 
Publication date: 10 February 2022
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy041
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worst caseauctions with resaleAusubel-Cramton-Vickrey (ACV) auctionduality in auction designnon-local incentive constraintsrobust revenue maximization
Cited In (23)
- Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
- Optimal Auction with Resale
- How to sell in a sequential auction market
- Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing
- Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
- Auctions with resale and risk aversion
- Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition
- Revenue-maximizing auctions: a bidder's standpoint
- Robust Incentives for Teams
- Two ways to auction off an uncertain good
- Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
- Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
- Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction
- Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- A two-part tariff monopolist with resale
- Optimal student allocation with peer effects
- Exclusive versus non-exclusive dealing in auctions with resale
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
- Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller
- Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps
- Robust incentives for information acquisition
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