Robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities
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Publication:5028526
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(23)- Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
- Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller
- Robust Incentives for Teams
- Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps
- Optimal Auction with Resale
- Robust incentives for information acquisition
- Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction
- Two ways to auction off an uncertain good
- Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
- Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition
- How to sell in a sequential auction market
- Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
- Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing
- A two-part tariff monopolist with resale
- Exclusive versus non-exclusive dealing in auctions with resale
- Optimal student allocation with peer effects
- Revenue-maximizing auctions: a bidder's standpoint
- Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
- Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
- Auctions with resale and risk aversion
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
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