Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0383-3zbMath1276.91060OpenAlexW2071159266MaRDI QIDQ2391058

Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger

Publication date: 24 July 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0383-3

zbMATH Keywords

resaleindependent private valuesoptimal auctioninverse virtual valuation functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions ⋮ Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions ⋮ Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Exclusive versus non-exclusive dealing in auctions with resale
• Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Optimal Auction Design
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Collusion via Resale
• Optimal Auction with Resale

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