Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0383-3MaRDI QIDQ2391058zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger

Publication date 24 July 2009

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0383-3

zbMATH Keywords

independent private valuesresaleoptimal auctioninverse virtual valuation functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Optimal Auction with Resale
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1183917 (Why is no real title available?)
• Collusion via resale
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Exclusive versus non-exclusive dealing in auctions with resale
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auction with Resale
• Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1

Cited in

(8)

• Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
• Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
• Auctions with resale at a later date
• Optimal Auction with Resale
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions
• Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
• Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option

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