Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
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Publication:2391058
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0383-3zbMath1276.91060OpenAlexW2071159266MaRDI QIDQ2391058
Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger
Publication date: 24 July 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0383-3
Related Items (5)
The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions ⋮ Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions ⋮ Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
Cites Work
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- Exclusive versus non-exclusive dealing in auctions with resale
- Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Optimal Auction Design
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Collusion via Resale
- Optimal Auction with Resale
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