Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0383-3zbMATH Open1276.91060OpenAlexW2071159266MaRDI QIDQ2391058FDOQ2391058

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger 

Publication date: 24 July 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0383-3

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zbMATH Keywords

independent private valuesresaleoptimal auctioninverse virtual valuation functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auction with Resale
• Exclusive versus non-exclusive dealing in auctions with resale
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
• Collusion via resale

Cited In (8)

• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
• Optimal Auction with Resale
• The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions
• Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
• Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
• Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
• Auctions with resale at a later date

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