Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed

DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01444-2zbMath1520.91189MaRDI QIDQ6107394

Tilman Klumpp, Xiaogang Che

Publication date: 3 July 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsresalesequential entryparticipation costssequential mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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