Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
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Publication:6107394
DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01444-2zbMath1520.91189MaRDI QIDQ6107394
Publication date: 3 July 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
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