Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
From MaRDI portal
Publication:980952
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.11.006zbMATH Open1230.91060OpenAlexW2166737235MaRDI QIDQ980952FDOQ980952
Authors: Xiaoyong Cao, Guoqiang Tian 
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.006
Recommendations
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
- Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation
- Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs
Cites Work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Auctions with entry
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Participation constraints in the Vickrey auction
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
- Participation in auctions
- Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
- Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
- Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
Cited In (19)
- Effects of competition in first-price auctions
- Auctions with entry and resale
- Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
- Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: comment
- Participation constraints in first-price auctions
- Informed entry in auctions
- Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
- Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
- Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs
- First-price auctions with unobservable entry
- Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
- A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
- Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
- Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
- On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
- Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs
- Participation in auctions
This page was built for publication: Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q980952)
