Participation constraints in first-price auctions

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00884-XzbMATH Open1542.91093MaRDI QIDQ6581891FDOQ6581891

Authors: Xiaoyong Cao, Shao-Chieh Hsueh, Guoqiang Tian, Wei Wang 

Publication date: 1 August 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
• First-price auctions with unobservable entry
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
• Participation costs and efficient auctions

zbMATH Keywords

existence and uniquenessfirst-price auctionsparticipation coststwo-dimensional private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Coordination in auctions with entry
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
• Participation constraints in the Vickrey auction
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
• Participation in auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions

Cited In (2)

• First-price auctions with unobservable entry
• A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation

This page was built for publication: Participation constraints in first-price auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6581891)