Participation constraints in first-price auctions

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00884-XMaRDI QIDQ6581891zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Xiaoyong Cao, Shao-Chieh Hsueh, Guoqiang Tian, Wei Wang

Publication date 1 August 2024

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

existence and uniquenessfirst-price auctionsparticipation coststwo-dimensional private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
• First-price auctions with unobservable entry
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
• Participation costs and efficient auctions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5873905 (Why is no real title available?)
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Coordination in auctions with entry
• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions
• Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
• Participation constraints in the Vickrey auction
• Participation in auctions
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.

Cited in

(2)

• First-price auctions with unobservable entry
• A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation

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