Competitive bidding with entry costs

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Publication:375027

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90126-0zbMath1273.91223OpenAlexW1987768304MaRDI QIDQ375027

William F. Samuelson

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90126-0




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