Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.006MaRDI QIDQ417675zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Brendan Daley, Konstantin Sonin, Michael Schwarz

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.006

zbMATH Keywords

signalingauctionsefficient mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• First-price auction implements efficient investments
• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas
• Investment decisions under first and second price auctions
• Investment dynamics with common and private values

Cites work

• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Auctions with costly information acquisition
• Auctions with entry
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The dynamic pivot mechanism
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Cited in

(6)

• On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
• Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
• Investment dynamics with common and private values
• First-price auction implements efficient investments
• Investment decisions under first and second price auctions
• Efficient investments in the implementation problem

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