The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
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Publication:3564698
DOI10.3982/ECTA7260zbMath1229.91206OpenAlexW3125327002MaRDI QIDQ3564698
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
Publication date: 26 May 2010
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7260
Bayesian learningdynamic mechanism designmarginal contributionex post equilibriumpivot mechanismmultiarmed bandit
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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