The dynamic pivot mechanism
DOI10.3982/ECTA7260zbMATH Open1229.91206OpenAlexW3125327002MaRDI QIDQ3564698FDOQ3564698
Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
Publication date: 26 May 2010
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7260
Recommendations
dynamic mechanism designBayesian learningmarginal contributionex post equilibriumpivot mechanismmultiarmed bandit
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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- Real-time pricing for LQG power networks with independent types: a dynamic mechanism design approach
- Taking turns
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