Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games
DOI10.1287/opre.2021.2205zbMath1493.91078arXiv1602.07570OpenAlexW2952275065MaRDI QIDQ5080666
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Yishay Mansour, Alex Slivkins, Zhiwei Steven Wu
Publication date: 31 May 2022
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.07570
Bayesian persuasionBayesian incentive compatibilityinformation designmultiarmed banditsexploration-exploitation trade-offrevenue management and market analyticsBayes-correlated equilibriumBayesian regret
Economics of information (91B44) Principal-agent models (91B43) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Related Items (4)
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