Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
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Publication:2100634
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.001zbMath1505.91104arXiv2105.13870OpenAlexW3164566143MaRDI QIDQ2100634
Konstantin Zabarnyi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Yakov Babichenko, Hai-Feng Xu
Publication date: 24 November 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.13870
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Cites Work
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