Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues
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Publication:5129202
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 700091 (Why is no real title available?)
- An analysis of queues with delayed information and time-varying arrival rates
- An equilibrium analysis of a discrete-time Markovian queue with endogenous abandonments
- An equilibrium analysis of a multiclass queue with endogenous abandonments in heavy traffic
- Analysis and comparison of queues with different levels of delay information
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Congestion Tolls for Poisson Queuing Processes
- Contact Centers with a Call-Back Option and Real-Time Delay Information
- Equilibrium balking strategies in the observable single-server queue with breakdowns and repairs
- Equilibrium customer strategies in a single server Markovian queue with setup times
- Game theory
- Inflation and Costs of Price Adjustment
- On Customer Contact Centers with a Call-Back Option: Customer Decisions, Routing Rules, and System Design
- Optimal balking strategies and pricing for the single server Markovian queue with compartmented waiting space
- Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games
- Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages
- Profit maximization in the M/M/1 queue
- Queues with choice via delay differential equations
- Rational queueing
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The Impact of Inspection Cost on Equilibrium, Revenue, and Social Welfare in a Single-Server Queue
- The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
- The optimal admission threshold in observable queues with state dependent pricing
- ``We will be right with you: managing customer expectations with vague promises and cheap talk
Cited in
(6)- On the optimal disclosure of queue length information
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
- ``Tell me what you need: signaling with limited resources
- Algorithms for persuasion with limited communication
- The effect of customer awareness on priority queues
- Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
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