Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues
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Publication:5129202
DOI10.1287/opre.2018.1819zbMath1444.90043OpenAlexW2902802037WikidataQ127394494 ScholiaQ127394494MaRDI QIDQ5129202
Krishnamurthy Iyer, David Lingenbrink
Publication date: 26 October 2020
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1819
Related Items
Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ On the optimal disclosure of queue length information ⋮ The effect of customer awareness on priority queues ⋮ Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
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