“We Will Be Right with You”: Managing Customer Expectations with Vague Promises and Cheap Talk

DOI10.1287/opre.1110.0976zbMath1241.91032OpenAlexW2144979199MaRDI QIDQ2893912

Itai Gurvich, Gad Allon, Achal Bassamboo

Publication date: 26 June 2012

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/81d128d616576dda33dc42fb57c2d5d5c8cd6e40

zbMATH Keywords

probability applications queues noncooperative stochastic model applications dynamic programming/optimal control balking and reneging games/group decisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

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