Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication

DOI10.1287/moor.2021.1218zbMath1498.91084arXiv2007.12489OpenAlexW4210273611MaRDI QIDQ5868967

Ronen Gradwohl, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky, Niklas Hahn

Publication date: 26 September 2022

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.12489

zbMATH Keywords

approximation algorithmspersuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
• Honest signaling in zero-sum games is hard, and lying is even harder
• Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues
• Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation
• On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No Externalities

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