Persuasion with limited communication capacity

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.104940MaRDI QIDQ2334129zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala

Publication date 7 November 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.04474

zbMATH Keywords

mutual informationcommunication channelBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Abstract: We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight, i.e., if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader can achieve this bound arbitrarily closely by using strategies that tie all the problems together. We characterize this optimal payoff as a function of the information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel.

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Cited in

(21)

• Impact of private observation in the Bayesian persuasion game
• The value of mediated communication
• Information revelation through signalling
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
• Communication with endogenous deception costs
• Markovian persuasion with two states
• Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions
• Paying with information
• Constrained versus unconstrained rational inattention
• Slow persuasion
• On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals
• Long information design
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Algorithms for persuasion with limited communication
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
• Persuasion and receiver's news
• Shannon meets Myerson: information extraction from a strategic sender
• Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
• The persuasion duality
• Noisy persuasion

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