Persuasion with limited communication capacity
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Publication:2334129
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.104940zbMath1426.91074arXiv1711.04474OpenAlexW2772196773MaRDI QIDQ2334129
Tristan Tomala, Maël Le Treust
Publication date: 7 November 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.04474
Related Items (15)
Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials ⋮ On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals ⋮ Noisy persuasion ⋮ Slow persuasion ⋮ Long information design ⋮ Paying with information ⋮ Communication with endogenous deception costs ⋮ Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition ⋮ The value of mediated communication ⋮ Constrained versus unconstrained rational inattention ⋮ Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria ⋮ Impact of private observation in the Bayesian persuasion game ⋮ Information revelation through signalling ⋮ Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
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