Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality
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Cites work
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- A cognitive hierarchy model of learning in networks
- A sparsity-based model of bounded rationality
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Business cycle dynamics under rational inattention
- Cursed Equilibrium
- Endogenous depth of reasoning
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Rational inattention dynamics: inertia and delay in decision-making
- Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer
Cited in
(13)- Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7306871 (Why is no real title available?)
- Paying for inattention
- Persuasion with limited communication capacity
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6874174 (Why is no real title available?)
- Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
- A NOTE ON PRICING OF PRODUCT QUALITY FOR STATUS CONCERNS
- Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer
- Rationally Inattentive Seller: Sales and Discrete Pricing
- Value computation and modulation: a neuroeconomic theory of self-control as constrained optimization
- Logit, CES, and rational inattention
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7742924 (Why is no real title available?)
- Misperception and cognition in markets
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