Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality
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Publication:2013338
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.007zbMATH Open1393.91070OpenAlexW3124324778MaRDI QIDQ2013338FDOQ2013338
Authors: Daniel Martin 
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.007
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Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- Cursed Equilibrium
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- A cognitive hierarchy model of learning in networks
- Business cycle dynamics under rational inattention
- Endogenous depth of reasoning
- A sparsity-based model of bounded rationality
- Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer
- Rational inattention dynamics: inertia and delay in decision-making
Cited In (13)
- Paying for inattention
- Misperception and cognition in markets
- Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
- A NOTE ON PRICING OF PRODUCT QUALITY FOR STATUS CONCERNS
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer
- Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
- Value computation and modulation: a neuroeconomic theory of self-control as constrained optimization
- Logit, CES, and rational inattention
- Persuasion with limited communication capacity
- Rationally Inattentive Seller: Sales and Discrete Pricing
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