Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105348zbMath1471.91229OpenAlexW3173998021MaRDI QIDQ2231430

Nicolás Figueroa, Carla Guadalupi

Publication date: 29 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105348

zbMATH Keywords

signalingasymmetric informationinformation acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• Market signaling with grades
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

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