Market signaling with grades

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.10.009zbMATH Open1296.91052OpenAlexW3124515236MaRDI QIDQ402067FDOQ402067

Authors: Brendan Daley, Brett Green 

Publication date: 27 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.009

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationsignalinginformation economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Comparing location experiments
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Sequential equilibria and stable sets of beliefs
• Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
• D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
• Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
• Waiting for news in the market for lemons
• Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
• Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Market signaling with grades
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
• Misinformation
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games

Cited In (18)

• Market signaling with grades
• Signaling covertly acquired information
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
• A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces
• False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
• The welfare cost of signaling
• Conveying value via categories
• Informative tests in signaling environments
• A signalling model of school grades under different evaluation systems
• Signaling under double-crossing preferences: the case of discrete types
• Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information
• Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: signaling under behavioral diversity
• Optimal grading
• Noisy signaling in discrete time
• Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms
• Test design under voluntary participation

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