Market signaling with grades
From MaRDI portal
Publication:402067
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.009zbMath1296.91052OpenAlexW3124515236MaRDI QIDQ402067
Publication date: 27 August 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.009
Related Items
Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information ⋮ Market signaling with grades ⋮ Informative tests in signaling environments ⋮ Signaling covertly acquired information ⋮ A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces ⋮ Job market signaling and employer learning ⋮ Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough ⋮ Noisy signaling in discrete time ⋮ False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad ⋮ Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation ⋮ Persuasion with costly precision
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