Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
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Publication:3662939
DOI10.2307/1912047zbMATH Open0515.90010OpenAlexW2066981120MaRDI QIDQ3662939FDOQ3662939
Leonard J. Mirman, Steven A. Matthews
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/494.pdf
private informationmonopolistic competitionstochastic demandpricing decisionsentry decisionssignalling equilibrialimit pricing equilibriumone- industry two-firm two-period model
Cited In (17)
- Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
- Market signaling with grades
- Signaling covertly acquired information
- Dynamic limit pricing and internal finance
- Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
- Duopoly signal jamming
- Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
- Competition and confidentiality: signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information
- Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- The analogical foundations of cooperation
- Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: signaling under behavioral diversity
- Type composition, career concerns, and signaling efforts
- Noisy signaling: theory and experiment
- Commitment and observability in games
- Noisy signaling in discrete time
- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
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