Type composition, career concerns, and signaling efforts

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9299-2zbMATH Open1281.91037OpenAlexW2114404433MaRDI QIDQ1934271FDOQ1934271

Authors: Chia-Hui Chen 

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9299-2

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zbMATH Keywords

career concernsdynamic signalingnoisy signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Repeated signaling games
• Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand

Cited In (1)

• Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments

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