The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
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Publication:4262869
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00084zbMATH Open0947.91059OpenAlexW2025183095MaRDI QIDQ4262869FDOQ4262869
Authors: Mathias Dewatripont, Ian Jewitt, Jean Tirole 
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00084
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Cited In (23)
- Career concerns, Beijing style
- Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
- Coordination under the shadow of career concerns
- Simple equilibria in general contests
- A theory of political cycles
- Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property
- Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
- Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
- Market-based incentives
- Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
- Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
- Imperfect memory and choice under risk
- Signaling drive over the long term
- Data and incentives
- Strategic shirking: a theoretical analysis of multitasking and specialization
- Type composition, career concerns, and signaling efforts
- Managerial reputation, risk-taking, and imperfect capital markets
- Transparency, career concerns, and incentives for acquiring expertise
- Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
- The benefits of aggregate performance metrics in the presence of career concerns
- Mixed up? That's good for motivation
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation
- When does centralization undermine adaptation?
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