INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS

DOI10.1111/iere.12212zbMath1404.91073OpenAlexW2201269917MaRDI QIDQ2980203

Jia Xie

Publication date: 28 April 2017

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123750

zbMATH Keywords

informationrisk sharingagency problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Ranking of signals in multitask agency models
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition

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