Moral hazard with bounded payments

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.12.004zbMATH Open1154.91536OpenAlexW2102894795MaRDI QIDQ960243FDOQ960243

Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels, Ian Jewitt

Publication date: 16 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:78364c1b-7232-4016-bf94-6a8e1e9ba929

Recommendations

• Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
• Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
• Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem

zbMATH Keywords

optionsdualitymoral hazardcompensationprincipal-agent modelslimited liability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Comparing location experiments
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity

Cited In (31)

• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Endogenous criteria for success
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
• A dual approach to agency problems
• Bidding for incentive contracts
• Participation in moral hazard problems
• An optimal reward contract against the manager's moral hazard with hidden information
• WAGE FLOORS, IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN
• The moral hazard problem with high stakes
• Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach
• PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
• A general solution method for moral hazard problems
• Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
• Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• Moral hazard and subjective evaluation
• The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• An analytically solvable principal-agent model
• INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS
• Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
• Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
• Optimal technology design
• The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model
• Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
• Moral hazard with a finite number of states
• Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
• Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
• Wealth effects and agency costs
• Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach

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