Moral hazard with bounded payments
From MaRDI portal
Publication:960243
Recommendations
- Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
- On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
- Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
- Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
- Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3281211 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Comparing location experiments
- Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Moral hazard with bounded payments
- Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
- The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
Cited in
(44)- Can agents be better off with pay caps?
- Moral hazard with bounded payments
- Endogenous criteria for success
- Bidding for incentive contracts
- Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
- A dual approach to agency problems
- Participation in moral hazard problems
- An optimal reward contract against the manager's moral hazard with hidden information
- On the design of piece-rate contracts
- The moral hazard problem with high stakes
- PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
- A general solution method for moral hazard problems
- Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
- Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
- Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
- The cost of moral hazard and limited liability in the principal-agent problem
- Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
- A general method for the existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
- Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory
- Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
- Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design
- Moral hazard and subjective evaluation
- On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
- The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
- An analytically solvable principal-agent model
- Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
- Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
- Moral hazard in high office and the dynamics of aristocracy
- Overconfidence and moral hazard
- Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
- The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model
- Compensation, perks, and welfare
- Optimal technology design
- Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
- Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
- Moral hazard with a finite number of states
- Wealth effects and agency costs
- Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
- Flexible moral hazard problems
- Moral hazard, incentive contracts, and risk: evidence from procurement
- Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
- Overconfidence and moral hazard without commitment
- Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
This page was built for publication: Moral hazard with bounded payments
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q960243)
