The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
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Publication:1092773
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(87)90005-XzbMath0627.90001OpenAlexW2024851821WikidataQ127942860 ScholiaQ127942860MaRDI QIDQ1092773
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90005-x
Related Items (18)
Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard ⋮ Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection ⋮ On the continuity of expected utility ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ A dual approach to agency problems ⋮ INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS ⋮ Wealth effects in the principal agent model ⋮ Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions ⋮ Moral hazard with bounded payments ⋮ A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems ⋮ Ranking of signals in multitask agency models ⋮ Participation in moral hazard problems ⋮ Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation ⋮ Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory ⋮ The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model ⋮ Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information ⋮ Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems ⋮ Dominant strategy mechanisms for contract auctions with risk aversion and moral hazard
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- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- On pointwise convergence, compactness and equicontinuity in the lifting topology. I
- Preservation of Weak Convergence Under Mapping
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