Wealth effects in the principal agent model

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2570zbMATH Open0937.91047OpenAlexW3125972173MaRDI QIDQ1970232FDOQ1970232

Authors: Henrik Thiele, Achim Wambach 

Publication date: 19 March 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2570

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zbMATH Keywords

agency costsprincipal's expected pay-offprincipal's surplus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

• Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model

Cited In (13)

• Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
• Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion
• The moral hazard problem with high stakes
• Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
• Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
• The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• Full downside risk aversion
• Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
• Reversibly greater downside risk aversion by a prudence-based measure
• Incentives and the structure of teams
• Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
• Wealth effects and agency costs

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