The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.08.013MaRDI QIDQ2667263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Behrang Kamali Shahdadi

Publication date 24 November 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.013

zbMATH Keywords

matchingtrackinglattice structureindirect peer effectssupermodular comparative statics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
• A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study

Cites work

• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Peer effects with random assignment: Results for Dartmouth roommates
• Strict monotonicity in comparative statics
• Wealth effects and agency costs
• Wealth effects in the principal agent model

Cited in

(12)

• Teacher labor markets, school vouchers, and student cognitive achievement: evidence from Chile
• Students' social origins and targeted grading
• A model of vertically differentiated education
• Top of the class: the importance of ordinal rank
• A theoretical general equilibrium analysis of local teacher labor markets under different compensation regimes
• Higher education expansion, tracking, and student effort
• Identifying peer achievement spillovers: implications for desegregation and the achievement gap
• Competition in public school districts: charter school entry, student sorting, and school input determination
• Educational production
• Same race teachers do not necessarily raise academic achievement
• Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare
• Ability peer effects in university: evidence from a randomized experiment

This page was built for publication: The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2667263)