Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
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Publication:2311161
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.024zbMath1418.91392OpenAlexW2945450877MaRDI QIDQ2311161
Publication date: 10 July 2019
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.024
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Cites Work
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- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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